A "Freshman" Takes Charge: Judge John J.
Parker of the United States Court of Appeals,
1925-1930
BY PETER G. FISH*

I. Introduction
udge John Johnston Parker served on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for more than
thr e decades from his appointment in 1925 to his death in
1958.' The Monroe, North Carolina native achieved prominence during his tenure as a jurist, administrator, judicial
reformer, and public servant.2 Neither Senate defeat of his
nomination by President Herbert Hoover as Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court' nor personal tragedy4 thwarted a judicial career that caused the American Bar Association
Journalto feature his portrait on its cover in 1946.' That career,
however inauspicious its prejudicial beginnings, seemingly
blossomed on the bench in the apparent absence of a period of
adjustment or of missteps associated with the status of a new-

comer.
Parker initially confessed misgivings about prospects for the
life of a federal judge. "I am afraid that I am temperamentally
unfit for a judgeship,"6 he mused nine months before donning
the robe of judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. 7 For the forty-year-old North Carolina attorney,
the fundamental career change made in 1925 reflected the
condition of his then extant professional and political life. A
legal practice of seventeen years and extensive partisan political
activities suggested neither a smooth and swift transition to the
bench nor a position of leadership once on the court of appeals.
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Yet, Parker's professional and political experiences would
combine with purely fortuitous events to propel him almost
immediately to a position of leadership on the court. That
position, however, imposed unsuspected costs detrimental to
promotion to the nation's highest court.
During the initial period ofjudicial service, newcomers have
long been reputed by scholars of the subject to have a minimal
impact on the work of their courts. As one student of the subject
has put it, their influence is diluted "as they absorb the particular
expectations of the job and the folkways of group life." 8
Opinion and managerial leadership lie beyond their grasp; both
remain in the hands of the senior judge and in those of experienced and skilled colleagues.' Thus, the newly sworn judge's
typical experience includes: (1) deference to senior members;
(2) rare opportunities to speak for the court; (3) indecision; and
(4) protracted opinion writing efforts.'0 J. Woodford Howard,
Jr. well described this "freshman effect" in his fine biography of
Supreme Court Associate Justice Frank Murphy." Revisionists
have challenged this "ice water" pattern of judicial socialization,
at least for newly appointed justices of the United States Supreme
Court. 2 Intermediate appellate courts are not identical to the
Supreme Court. They are, as Howard noted in his seminal work
on the federal courts of appeals, tribunals distinguished by their
fragmented and permissive nature and by relatively low levels of
internal conflict.' 3
These courts were and remain characterized by geographical
separation of their members who assemble for scheduled periods
of collegiality at the regional courts' seats. Since 1866, the
Fourth Circuit has comprised the states of Maryland, West
Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. 4 Its
primary seat is at Richmond and, since 1916, during Parker's
judgeship, it also held a summer term at Asheville in the North
Carolina mountains. 5 The three judges of the court were
dispersed from 1925 to 1931, residing in Baltimore to 1927,
Richmond, Huntington after 1927, and Charlotte." Telephone,
telegraph, and, especially, fast overnight railway mail linked them.
Onto this appellate court came ex-politician and practicing
lawyer, John J. Parker. Would his adjustment to the robe in his
initial years accord with the conventional wisdom that views7
judicial novitiates as bewildered, uncertain, and disoriented?
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Or, would he prove the exception to the rule and manifest
confidence, decisiveness, and professionalism from his first days
on the court? In short, did his "freshman" experience bestow
only benefits or did it impose costs, even high and unanticipated
costs? Or did it confer some of both?

II. Anticipatory Socialization
A. Legal Practice
Parker's professional career began at the University of North
Carolina in Chapel Hill where the penurious undergraduate had
arrived in 1903 to commence what turned out to be an educational experience marked by outstanding academic achievements
and campus leadership positions.' "He came," one contemporary recalled, "as a poor boy who didn't even have a trunk, but
he graduated with a trunkful of medals."' 9 With "no influential
connections"2 and armed only with a law degree earned at the
University in a year of post-graduate work, Parker made an
inauspicious entry into the profession, one accompanied by the
"usual years of starvation as a beginning lawyer."'" But oratorical abilities apparent in college won him recognition as a
courtroom advocate in the classic nineteenth century legal
tradition.2 2 Peers at the bar regarded him as a "zealous, able
and even brilliant lawyer" whose courtroom skills made him an
adversary at once "dangerous and formidable." 3 Natural gifts
were enhanced by "daily and nightly painstaking, accurate study
of the law, and of the facts of his cases."2 4
A varied civil 'and criminal practice grew and carried Parker
to trial and appellate federal and state courts as well as to the
Supreme Court of the United States.25 His move from a rural
county seat to the city of Charlotte a was accompanied by a
rising net worth as estimated by Martindale's American Law
Directory.2" Although a remunerative practice, it was one that
drew clients "from all classes of the people, including laboring
people and farmers, white people and colored people."28
Predictably, few notable cases came to the young practitioner.
One that did come his way gave him national visibility within the
legal profession. In the "Par Clearance" Case, he represented
300 state-chartered "country" banks in their battle against
hegemonic banking policies pursued by the Federal Reserve Bank
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of Richmond, Virginia.29 Ultimate victory for his clients came
in the United States Supreme Court, where he prevailed against
the Bank's battery of prominent attorneys including Wall Street
lawyer and soon-to-be 1924 Democratic presidential nominee,
John W. Davis."
B. Politician
Notwithstanding success at the bar and general satisfaction
with lawyering,3 Parker found the peripatetic role of a litigator a
"wearing" one. Since the inception of his law practice, Parker
had been deeply involved in politics. He early associated with the
Republican Party and warmly embraced its national industrial
policy founded on a protective tariff seemingly beneficial to an
aspiring "New South."3 2 Political activism led to party recognition, and an alternate career path beckoned. In 1910, at age
twenty-five, he became a G.O.P. congressional candidate;33 in
34
1916, he received the state attorney generalship nomination; 35
and in 1920, he won the party's gubernatorial nomination.
But during the early twentieth century, North Carolina remained
firmly entrenched in the "Solid South," and Parker's energetic
partisan efforts bore no fruit on that state's political terrain so
barren for Republicans. 6 Politics could admittedly clothe him
with "great prestige" in the state and nation. 7 Nevertheless, the
three-time loser also recognized that "there
is nothing so
38
disappointing and heartbreaking as politics."

C. Political Lawyer
Parker's dual careers in law and politics paved the way for a
critical transformation into a political lawyer. Appointment as
Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States in
the War Transactions Section of the Department ofJustice thrust
the North Carolina attorney into the turbulent world of political
law and, more significantly, into association with public officials
capable of influencing the course of his life.3 9 Parker's assignment involved the prosecution of former high-ranking officials of
the Wilson Administration for alleged frauds associated with
World War I demobilization.4" Neither his efforts to secure
indictments of those who allegedly conspired to dispose of
surplus leather goods4 nor his courtroom prosecution of
defendants accused of defrauding the government in lumber
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transactions succeeded.4 2 If favorable outcomes in the politically charged cases eluded him, favorable comments did not. "I
have never known a case to be more thoroughly prepared, more
studiously arranged for trial or more ably presented to the
[c]ourt on the law and to the Ijiury on the facts than was the
lumber fraud case by Mr. Parker," one opposing counsel
subsequently declared.4 3 Favorable too were impressions made
on colleagues in the department, including then Attorney
General and future Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.44
III. To the Bench
When the summer of 1925 carried off presiding Fourth
Circuit Judge Charles A. Woods of South Carolina,4 5 Parker's
self-doubts about a judicial career dissolved.46 North Carolina
Republican party politics spawned two key Washington-based
sponsors in the Coolidge administration. Both were important
officeholders in Andrew Mellon's Treasury Department.4 7 At
the same time, former Justice Department associates, most a full
generation older than Parker, rallied to his cause, one hailing
him as "an Adonis in robes, a Mansfield in exposition."4 8 Justice
Stone wrote Department officials that he had "formed a very
favorable opinion of Mr. Parker [because of] his 49attitude as
prosecutor in the Phillips [sic] Lumber Fraud case."
If Tar Heel Republicans and government lawyers knew all
about Parker, his future colleagues on the court of appeals were
hard pressed to identify one without much public visibility and
largely devoid of a "paper trail." Presiding (Senior Circuit) Judge
Edmund Waddill, Jr., when queried by Chief Justice William
Howard Taft, reported that "a lawyer by the name of JJ. Parker,
... I do not know."5 A Department of Justice probe evoked
a slightly more positive identification from the elderly presiding
judge. "I have seen his name mentioned," Waddill wrote
Coolidge's Attorney General, "and I have no doubt I know him,
but for the soul of me I cannot recall anything about him at this
time."'" Waddill's worldly colleague, John Carter Rose, contacted by the Department while sojourning in London, replied in
similar fashion. "At the moment I cannot place Mr. John J.
Parker," he wrote, adding that "it is highly probable that if
something was said which would identify him, I would find that
I did know him or at all events knew something about him."5 2
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JudgeJohnJ. Parker (left) following his appointment in 1925 by President Calvin Coolidge
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit holding a cane given to him by former
Monroe, North Carolina law partner, Amos M. Stack, met with his undergraduate mentor
at the University of North Carolina, Philosophy Professor Henry Horace Williams (right).
Source Francis I. Parker, copy in possession of the author.
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On receipt of a recess appointment, Parker took the judicial
oath on the opening day of the circuit court's regular October
term.53 Present were colleagues Rose, age sixty-one, and Waddill,
age seventy.54 The latter had recently been elevated to presiding judge status by the death of predecessor Woods, thereby
creating the vacancy filled by Parker.55 Both veteran jurists must
have looked askance at their newest member. Had this general
practitioner from a decidedly rural state, a jury-oriented courtroom orator in the tradition of the previous century, and above
all, a partisan warrior fresh from political and legal wars acquired
the skills, interests, and values essential for performance of the
judicial role?5 6 Parker's previous experience in both politics
and the law only marginally reassured his more experienced
colleagues.
IV. Court of Appeals
A. Caseloads and Colleagues
The court that Parkerjoined in the autumn of 1925 suffered
serious internal problems. An excessive caseload, however, was
not among them. The tribunal basked in a near golden age; "the
strictly appellate work of the Circuit Court of Appeals for this
Circuit is [not] too heavy or too exhausting," one colleague
frankly admitted.5 7 Caseloads from 1926 through 1930 averaged
186 cases per fiscal year or, divided equally among three judges,
34.3 to 49.3 terminated cases per judge per fiscal year or an
average of 41.8 such cases [Table A]. As compared to other
regional circuits, the Fourth consistently occupied the case-filing
basement in company with the First and Seventh Circuits and,
after 1928, the sprawling Tenth Circuit in the West [Table B].
Once docketed, appeals in the Fourth Circuit flowed expeditiously; less than nine months elapsed between the filing of the record
and issuance of the court's final mandate in the average case
[Table C]. The bench typically acted whenever the attorneys
signaled their readiness for oral arguments as suggested by the
time span between filing of the last brief and oral argument, a
period which ranged from one to 192 days and averaged 19.5
days [Table C].
Not caseloads but rather physical disabilities, death, and
turnover confused court administration and sapped the court's
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strength during Parker's freshman years.
Its experienced
intellectual leader, John Carter Rose of Baltimore, fell ill in 1926
and died early in 1927; 58 the elderly Waddill died in April 1931,
after suffering crippling periodic illnesses and enduring the
distress and distractions caused by his son's drug addiction.59
Rose's replacement, fifty-eight-year-old Elliott Northcott of West
Virginia,60 proved neither to be his predecessor's intellectual
equal nor to enjoy especially good health.6' Absenteeism meant
that the court's trio of appellate jurists sat together in less than
one-third of all cases heard.62 Thus, the court was in reality a
mixed tribunal composed of visiting trial and resident appellate
judges in nearly seventy percent of all cases heard." Among the
latter, the relatively youthful Parker enjoyed the best health and,
consequently, sat more than the others. His participation rate
exceeded that of all district judges combined and of RoseNorthcott and Waddill. 64 Available to him was the power to
influence judicial decision-making denied his nonsitting, though
senior, colleagues.65
B. "Freshman" Workhorse
Oral arguments and signed opinions were the order of the
day in the Fourth Circuit of the 1920s. Slightly less than onequarter of all appeals would be terminated by means of unsigned
per curiam opinions.6 6 The balance received full court opinions. The writing was assigned disproportionately to the three
circuit judges who, although sitting together in little more than
thirty percent of the cases, individually wrote opinions in 79.2
percent of those arguments they heard.67 Fellowship and "low
seniority in assignments" might mark the freshman experience
on the Supreme Court, as Howard noted in his celebrated article
"On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice,"68 but neither characterized
Parker's experience. The Fourth Circuit freshman proved to be
the court's "workhorse." He received more than his share of
opinions assigned to appellate judges, 44.3 percent. 69 RoseNorthcott followed with 35.7 percent, 7 while Senior Circuit
Judge Waddill received, presumably from himself, only 20.1
percent of all such assignments. 71 Of the assignments made to
both circuit judges and visiting trial judges, Parker similarly led
[Table D].
Although the presiding judge traditionally assigned opinions,
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Waddill's low participation rate meant that factors other than
formal status played a role in appellate court opinion assignments.7" So too, in assigning opinions in three-judge district
court cases, custom gave way. In such cases, often involving
important public policy-laden issues testing the limits of national
and state regulation of economic life, prevailing custom prescribed assignment and authorship by the resident district judge
within whose jurisdiction the case had originated. 7'
The
putative tradition proved tenuous in practice because Parker
performed the task in one-third of such three-judge court cases
in which he sat. 74 "You are beyond controversy the presiding
elder," Judge Henry Clay McDowell of the Western District of
Virginia informed Parker, twenty-four years McDowell's junior
with six months judicial experience behind him. "It
is for you,"
75
case."
the
assign
"to
him,
told
judge
prius
nisi
the
Reputation and ascribed expertise routed cases to those
judges who could best enhance the authority of the court's
opinions. Professional considerations usually meant an assignment to Parker, the freshman judge who authored either the
majority or plurality opinions in complex cases. Opinions in
more than three-fifths of all appeals involving patent law and the
government's regulation of business fell to Parker. Diversitybased contract disputes comprised the largest single component
of the court's docket [Table E], and Parker wrote nearly twice as
many opinions in such cases than did any one of his colleagues
[Table F].
Parker similarly outdistanced his colleagues in
opinions involving tax questions. Only in cases raising typically
straightforward issues of criminal law and procedure, including
civil actions for violations of federal law (e.g., forfeitures) and of
torts, admiralty, and corporate law did he author less than onethird of the court's full opinions [Table F].
Parker's enthusiasm, energy, and intellectual prowess
contributed to the frequency of opinions that he authored in
cases heard by all three appellate judges. Sometimes, however,
the assignments merely reflected Waddill's managerial shortcomings; the indifferent performance of this function by the senior
judge occasionally left unclear whether or not an assignment had
actually been made. Parker provided clarity by volunteering. In
the midst of work on several cases raising jurisdictional issues, he
reported to the senior judge that "these have not been assigned
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to me, but I assumed from what you said after the argument that
you wanted me to prepare the opinions."76 Skillful post-conference legal analysis also won Parker opinion-writing duties that
included authoring both of the court's two Sherman Act cases
decided in the last half of the 1920s. In the cool of the Carolina
mountains during the summer of 1926, he studied the 2,000-page
record of an antitrust suit between Union Carbide and one of its
hard-pressed competitors.7 7 His conclusions won favorable
comment from the Senior Circuit Judge.7 1 "I was considerably
impressed with the comprehensiveness of the views set forth,"
Waddill declared, and promptly suggested that his junior
79
colleague pen the opinion.
Parker, the eager volunteer, subsequently mailed out another
detailed memorandum." Ten typed pages long, it critiqued a
case that involved one more application of the antitrust act, this
time to the United Mine Workers of America then attempting to
unionize the bituminous coalfields of southern West Virginia.
Whether to affirm DistrictJudge George W. McClintic's sweeping
injunction decree against the union and in favor of operators of
316 coal companies confronted the court of appeals in International Organization, United Mine Workers of America v. Red jacket
Consolidated Coal & Coke Co.8" Who would write the court's
opinion? Parker recommended to Waddill that the task go to
Rose because the primary issues related to federal procedure and
jurisdiction, subjects on which the scholarly Marylander had
written a treatise, then published in its third edition.82 But
Waddill declined the advice.83 Impressed with Parker as a
"quick worker," with his apparent fidelity to stare decisis,

84

and

with his "comprehensive" ten-page Red Jacket memorandum in
hand, Waddill felt that the freshman judge "had gotten the strike
case where we will all agree. '85 No assignment from 1925 to
1930 proved so fateful for its recipient as did that of Red Jacket,
the full consequences of which did not become evident until
1930 when President Hoover named Parker to the United States
86

Supreme Court.

C. Short-lived Mentor
Parker's deference to Rose in the Red Jacket opinion
assignment suggested a traditional "freshman" syndrome
reflecting inexperience and feelings of inadequacy, as Howard
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John Carter Rose (186,1-1927) of Baltimore, Maryland had been appointed in
1910 by President William Howard Taft to the U.S. Court for the District of
Maryland and in 1922 by President Warren Harding to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Nearing death, the intellectual leader of the
court warned of pitfalls associated with the Red Jacket case. Source. Proceedings
of the Thirty-ninth Annual Meeting, the Virginia State Bar Association held at
Chamberlin-Vanderbilt Hotel, Old Point Comfort: August 1,2 and 3, 1928 (n.p., n.p.,
n.d.), opp. 177.

noted.8 7 And, in fact, the self-conscious newcomer did look for
assistance and support, especially from the veteran jurist and
former journalist whom he regarded as a master of "clarity" and
'88
a writer possessed of an exceptional "power of expression."
Rose's critiques of opinion drafts were warmly welcomed. The
judicial neophyte confessed that "the writing of opinions is new
business to me and I want to do the best I can."89 Consequently
he invited the senior judge's "criticism of the grammar and the
forms of expression as well as any mistakes in the law."9
Similar solicitation went out to Waddill. But the increasingly
infirm presiding judge found it difficult to keep up with his own
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assignments, much less contribute to Parker's. In fact, with his
youngest colleague delving deeply into cases, Waddill begged off,
in one instance stating that "I have not given the thought to it I
ought to have done, and which your letter will, in large measure,
relieve me from the necessity of doing."'"
Rose's tutelage made a difference, notwithstanding its brief
duration. In a way that the inexperienced Parker did not, his
colleague from Maryland keenly perceived fluidity in judicial
choice. His suggestions "radically changed" one of Parker's
opinions, involving an unfamiliar area of admiralty law.92 Even
in a war profiteering case, about which ex-war frauds prosecutor
Parker entertained sympathies running strongly with the
government, Rose's arguments turned Parker's vote against the
government and in favor of wool dealers charged with making
"excess profits" from sales to the military.9" Advice proffered
less than three weeks before his death by an ailing Rose fundamentally affected the freshman's perception of a critical issue in
the labor injunction case.94 Parker's opinion in the Red Jacket
case would figure importantly in his 1930 confirmation defeat as
a Supreme Court nominee.95
D. Red Jacket
The American Federation of Labor, in its opposition to the
Parker Supreme Court nomination, perceived his opinion in Red
Jacket as clear evidence of anti-labor proclivities. Such unfavorable judicial attitudes toward labor would only serve in the eyes
of A.EL. President William Green and his compatriots to
reinforce those then prevailing on the High Court.9 6 Predictably, labor focused its attention on the injunction against the
United Mine Workers of America affirmed by Parker in RedJacket.
At issue was the scope of that injunction. It constituted, after the
paramount issue of federal jurisdiction, the pivotal substantive
question in a case against the union brought by coal companies
including the Red Jacket Consolidated Coal and Coke Company
working the West Virginia coalfields. 9v The Mingo County-based
enterprise became the named complainant, winning a favorable
decree from Judge George W. McClintic of the Southern District
of West Virginia. That decree had swept broadly, barring the
union "from counseling or advising that [the mine operators]
should in any way or manner be injured in the conduct and
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management of their business and in the enjoyment of their
property and property rights."98
Parker would not adopt in full the lower court's decree, but,
busy as he was, neither would he abandon well-established
precedent-Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell.99 That landmark opinion, penned by Associate Justice Mahlon Pitney, had
originated in West Virginia's Panhandle and within the Fourth
Circuit. The High Court's reversal of appeals court Judge Jeter
C. Pritchard's pro-labor opinion cast a shield of constitutional
protection around "yellow-dog" contracts safeguarded by the then
ascendant "liberty of contract" doctrine spawned by substantive
The constitutionality of such
due process jurisprudence.'
contracts barring or ousting from employment those employees
who joined a union had ever since been deemed so settled an
area of law that neither the UMWA briefs nor the arguments of
its counsel raised the question in Red Jacket.'0
The decade-old decision in Hitchman prevented unlawful
interference with labor relations founded on "yellow-dog"
contracts. Interfering unionization strategies might include
either or both unlawful purposes and unlawful means. The
former existed whenever a third party not composed of employees of the targeted business sought to organize that business's
employees in order to strike, and win collective bargaining rights,
and thereby impair the constitutionally protected liberty of2
contract enjoyed by the owner and his individual employees.1
Malicious organizing strategies such as deception, misrepresentation, and threats of pecuniary loss, apparent in the facts of
Hitchman, were deemed to be unlawful means. 0 3 The Fourth
Circuit court, in an opinion authored by Waddill and concurred
in by Rose and neophyte Judge Parker, had addressed both the
"yellow-dog" contract issue and the equity power of courts to
protect such contracts when applying the Hitchman doctrine to a
case with similar facts. Argued during Parker's first term on the
appellate court and published a year later, in 1926, the case was
styled as Bittner v. West Virginia-PittsburghCoal Co.'" 4
The fortuitous assignment to Parker of the opinion in Red
Jacket left the freshman to draft the court's opinion in a legal
conflict that challenged the judiciary's capacity to effect social
and economic change. The author had initially embraced
Hitchman's twin prongs, unlawful purpose and unlawful means,
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RED JACKET CONSOLIDATED COAL & COKE Co.,INc.
RED JACKET,WEST VIRGINIA

The Mines of the Red Jacket Coal and Coke Company, denoted by dots, were located in the
Thacker Coalfield, Mingo County, in the southwestern corner of West Virginia bordering
Kenttcky along the Tug Fork River. Source. Map by Susan N. Havrilesky. U.S. Geological
Survey, Dept. of the Interior, W. Va.-Ky.-Va. Matewan Quadrangle (1928); logo-letterhead in
letter from Landon C. Bell to Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, june 28, 1935,
Red jacket, Records of U.S. Cts. App., Record Group 276 (4th Cir.) 54-A-0177, Box 49, File
No. 7-10-025-5-1 (available at National Archives and Records Administration: Mid Atlantic
Region, Philadelphia, Pa).
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although only the unlawful purpose test related to the facts of
Red Jacket.10 5 That test remained undisturbed by intervening,
but in his view, either supportive or distinguishable Supreme
Court cases.1" 6 In reaching this conclusion, "freshman" Parker
had "reached into pigeon holes," as Howard so aptly put it, 7
and predictably pulled out Hitchman. The precedent with its
Fourth Circuit progeny appeared to neatly fit the facts of Red
Jacket. Rose disagreed with his junior colleague's assessment. He
challenged the view that a third-party union interloper in pursuit
of an unlawful purpose enjoyed absolutely no right to persuade
employees under "yellow-dog" contracts even to "stop work" as
Parker had stated in his memorandum. 0 8 Admittedly Hitchman
controlled and, Rose wrote, "you are quite possibly right that it
requires an injunction against even . . . persuasion to join the
Union when the persuaders know that those they seek to
persuade have bargained not to do so.' ' 1° He added: "I frankly
do not like the Hitchman case and I think the subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court show that it is conscious that it
went a little too far .... I would like to limit, as far as the
Hitchman case ... will let us, injunctions against peaceful
persuasion to join the union.""'
Senior Judge Waddill entertained no such doubts.
Hitchman, he recalled, had been
"perfectly clear" on the very point troubling Rose."' Perhaps
the High Court had emitted signals of impending modification
of the labor law precedent, but that was of no concern to an
intermediate court. "If the Supreme Court' 2wants to qualify it,
they should do it, not us," Waddill advised.
Caught between the clashing views advanced by his senior
colleagues, Parker equivocated. "Judicial flux"" 3 unexpectedly
confronted him. He tightly grasped onto his professed Blackstonian approach ("not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
expound and maintain the old one") 1 4 and to a preferred
formal opinion style. The latter favored exposition that was
"clear and concise and, while not overburdened with quotations,
given a sufficient citation of authority to show that the conclusions are well-sustained and in line with the current of judicial
decisions.'' 5 To be avoided were dicta and explanatory statements that might illuminate underlying public policy, yet partake
of the legislative function. 1 6 Labor cases in particular called
for a parsimonious style. He had asserted six months earlier in
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a case arising out of the 1922 railway shopmen's strike" 7 that
the court should eschew making "observations in fields so fraught
with controversy where anything said is likely to be misinterpreted."' l Wisdom dictated that the judges "say nothing except
what the decision of the case necessitates."'' 9 The opinion in
Red Jacket, consisting of eighteen typed pages, largely conformed
12
with its author's perception of the ideal opinion.
The draft opinion underwent a transformation in response
to the now deceased Rose's glimpse of a judicial choice. Parker
retreated from his initial reliance on the unadulterated Hitchman
doctrine. While at first he had viewed that doctrine as one which
barred a union's mere "interference with the contract," 121 he
came to approve union efforts "to extend its membership
throughout the industry"'2 2 by using what Rose had termed
"peaceful persuasion to join the union."'2 3 Rose apparently
remembered, even if Waddill had not, the presiding judge's
opinion in the case of West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. In it,
Waddill had heeded arguments advanced by UMWA counsel for
a proviso permitting peaceful "advocacy of union membership"
so long as they remained free "from attempts to persuade the
complainant's employees or any of them to violate their contracts
with it.'

24

Inclusion of the proviso had struck a decidedly

discordant note in an opinion that largely echoed Hitchman and
replicated the language of the injunctive decree affirmed by
Justice Pitney.125
Influenced by Rose and having reconsidered Waddill's
confusing 1926 opinion, Parker's final draft represented a
revision in his thinking initially advanced in the memorandum.
Red Jacket permitted pro-union speech directed to "employees of
complainants who are under contract not to join the union while
remaining in complainant's service."' 26
It also permitted
speech aimed at persuading such employees to leave their
employment and join the union in order to strike or to refrain
from entering the employer's work place for the same purpose.
What the union could not do was to approach employees
working under "yellow dog" contracts "and induce them, in
violation of their contracts, to join the union and go on a strike
for the purpose of forcing the company to recognize the union
or of impairing its power of production.' ' 127

The subtlety of

Parker's spartan language veiled its essence in 1927 and especially

A "FRESHMAN" TAKES CHARGE

in 1930.
In the best Blackstonian tradition, the freshman jurist
necessarily relied on the prevailing Hitchman doctrine as "conclusive of the point involved here." 2' 8 But he would contend that
his decree, as distinguished from the trial court's, was "certainly
not as broad as that of the decree approved by the Supreme
Court in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell."'129 Red Jacket
drew narrower bounds for restraints on pro-union speech
because Parker drew a fine distinction between peaceful persuasion to break and thus violate "yellow-dog" contracts and such
speech intended merely to interfere with them. Only the former
was prohibited in that it incorporated Hitchman's unlawful means
test. Shed was that landmark decision's ban on even undefined
hampering of the operations of businesses using constitutionally
protected indeterminate employment contracts. And so, in the
end, a wavering Parker adopted the advice advanced by Rose and
discounted that which emanated from the elderly presidingjudge
of his bench. The freshman's Blackstonian tendencies and his
opinion craftsmanship that allowed no room for overt criticism
of Hitchman would provide little protection when his opinion
came under fire three years later in the political cauldrons on the
brink of a sea change in national life. 3 '
Untoward political events lay in Parker's future as he labored
on during his freshman years. The author of Red Jacket had
previously assumed a de facto leadership role on a court
handicapped by physical disabilities and the death of one of its
members. The opinion then became for a fleeting moment a
faint memory for a recently appointed and busy judge.
E. Praise and Job Satisfaction
Prior to his work on Red Jacket and before the eclipse of
Rose, who died three weeks before the issuance of that opinion, 3 ' Parker's industry and apparent professional expertise
made a profound impact on both bench and bar. Senior Judge
Waddill could hardly restrain his enthusiasm for the "freshman"
colleague whom he praised as "our crack man" only two months
after the North Carolinian had ascended the bench.'3 2 When
the October 1925 term in Richmond ended and Parker's opinion
assignments were completed, the elderly presiding judge allayed
Chief Justice Taft's initial trepidation over the appointment.'
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"He is a first class judge," Waddill effused,
[a] sure-enough find, and dispatches business with greater ease and
facility than any new judge with whom it has been my privilege to be
thrown ....

[H]e sat in forty out of forty-two cases, was fully prepared

and ready for conference every time, and we found him to be a really
helpful co-worker." 4

Parker similarly impressed members of the court's bar with "his
wide-awake, analytic, and comprehensive intellect."' 35 He was
"perfectly fair and courteous to all counsel," one attorney
reported, and "his questions went squarely and fearlessly to the
heart of each case and presented the issue in such simplicity as
perhaps the lawyers themselves had not previously grasped."3 6
If the newcomer enjoyed a favorable reputation among
colleagues on the bench and at the bar, he derived great
personal satisfaction from his new office. Parker relished the
tasks associated with it. The work itself was admittedly "quite a
change from the practice of law,"' 37 yet after less than a month
on the court, he boasted of having gotten "the hang of things"
while puzzling over cases "in the main of an important nature."' 38
Impressive, too, was the quality of argumentation;
cases presented to the court struck him as "well argued by lawyers
' 39
who stand ... at the forefront of the bar."'
V. Freshman Achievements
Parker's acknowledged leadership traits were mobilized to
promote the administration of justice in the Fourth Circuit.
Notwithstanding his youth and lack of seniority, the freshman
judge (1) nurtured harmonious intra-circuit law, thereby guiding
the Circuit's district judges; (2) promoted simple and efficient
legal procedures; and (3) labored to systematize court administration.
A. Substantive Law
The development of the law in the circuit concerned Parker,
as had been evident in his work on the opinion in Red Jacket. He
worked to shape and to harmonize this body of regional law.
One strategy involved avoiding dissenting opinions. Unanimity
in fact marked 95.8 percent of the opinions handed down by the
Fourth Circuit from 1.925 to mid-1930. 40
But the low 4.2

A "FRESHMAN" TAKES CHARGE

percent dissent rate masked the extent of intra-court conflict.
The spectrum of judicial choice was broad indeed, clearer in
other cases than had initially seemed true in the labor case.
Subordinating intra-court conflict and thereby avoiding overt
dissent rested on professional strategies of self-effacement and
public silence. Parker suggested the former in omitting from a
draft opinion "a number of matters which I advanced in conference." 41 Included now were "only such matters as I considered
necessary to the decision of the case, thinking that if Judge
McDowell should decide to concur in the opinion, he would
prefer that I omit the matters about which he was doubtful."' 42
A strategy of omission might ultimately result in laconic per
curiam opinions, thereby disposing of cases efficiently while also
muting intra-court conflicts. Thus, in a wrongful death case the
circuit court affirmed the trial judge's directed verdict for the
defendant railroad.'43 Silence enveloped the deeply divisive
and critical jurisdictional issue: Was the deceased "kitchen
flunky," a member of a masonry repair crew hired by the
railroad, actually involved in interstate commerce at the time of
death in the railroad yards? To avoid time-consuming reargument of that point, Parker formulated a "per curiam so as to
show the conclusion at which all of us arrived, namely, that there
was no actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, and
144
so as not to say anything about the question of jurisdiction."'
Even in cases on which he had not sat, Parker scrutinized
the work of associates to assure a harmonious law of the circuit
to guide its bench and bar. "I congratulate you particularly upon
the fine way in which you have handled case no. 2851," he wrote
District Judge Duncan Lawrence Groner of the Eastern District
of Virginia. 145 "I was very much worried about it because of its
'
Especially pleasing was
effect as a precedent in this circuit." 146
the Virginiajudge's skillful restriction of the court's equity power
to reform insurance contracts in light of a "greatly criticized
expansive Supreme Court decision subsequently extended by
some lower federal courts."'4 7 Less complimentary was his
evaluation of colleague Northcott's handiwork. Of the West
Virginian's draft opinion, Parker worried that "there are some
expressions in it which I am inclined to think might cause
trouble in the future, as they do not coincide with what I
understand to be the North Carolina law with respect to chattel
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Elliott Northcott (1869-1946) of Huntington, West
Virginia succeeded Judge Rose in 1927 on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and retired from the
bench in 1939. Source. Proceedings of the Fifty-sixth Annual
Meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association held at Virginia
Beach, Virginia: 1946 (Richmond: Virginia Press, 1946),
opp. 128.

148
mortgages and their effect against trustees in bankruptcy."
A five-page argument followed. It construed state law as found
in a then-recent Fourth Circuit decision penned by resident
expert Parker and later cited with approval by the United States
149
Supreme Court.
Similarly, circuit law might be reinforced by circulation of an
unpublished memorandum authored by one district judge and
approved by another. To a wavering trial judge on intra-circuit
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assignment, Parker invoked the authority of nisi prius brethren.
He noted:
[S]ome two years ago Judge [Ernest F] Cochran [E.D.S.C.] and Judge
[Morris A.] Soper [D. Md.], whom I know you agree with me in regarding
as among the ablest judges in the Circuit, sat with me in the hearing of

the Lottie Cochran case.

We decided in that case that the error

complained of was not harmless, but Judge Cochran prepared and

submitted a memorandum on the doctrine of harmless error, which all of
us agreed to as being the law.'

A copy of Judge Cochran's memorandum accompanied the
letter.'

When dissents occurred, Parker acknowledged to one
dissident that it was "entirely possible that we are wrong about
the matter and that you are right; but we have done the best that
we could." '
In the end, the Supreme Court would measure
his professional judgment and that of his colleagues. Should he
err, Parker confidently asserted that "the Supreme Court will
probably straighten me out.""'5

His confidence was misplaced

because even in the 1920s, the High Court's supervision was
intermittent; writs of certiorari under the court's expanded
discretionary power authorized by Congress in 1925151 were
granted in a mere 8.22 percent of all Fourth Circuit cases in
which an appellant petitioned for a writ. 51 Among those
denied certiorari was RedJacket.'5 6 Denial in such cases meant
to Parker that "the Court has evidently concluded that we were
right in our conclusion," or that "we ... decided the questions

in accordance with the ideas of the Supreme Court."'5 7 The
political process would subsequently adjudge that freshman
interpretation of the meaning ascribed to Supreme Court actions
to be an erroneous one.
The imperative of nurturing cohesive regional law that
accorded with prevailing case law, with or without specific
Supreme Court intervention, fused with another demand:
communicating that law to the districtjudges. Thus an admiralty
case involving seamen's wage claims impressed Parker as "a good
case in which to write an opinion and lay down the law as to
waiting time."' 58 A bankruptcy case involving a lien claim
presented an opportunity to educate the lower bench in "the
' while a
proper practice to be followed in cases of this kind,"159
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personal injury case enabled the appellate court to differentiate
the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk.16 ° The distinction between the two common law tort
doctrines was of little consequence in the case at hand; it loomed
large, however, in cases arising under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act. 161 Such upper court guidance received one
federal trial judge's effusive commendation. "Allow me to
congratulate you upon these opinions," Judge Cochran of South
Carolina's Eastern District wrote Parker. He had "been disturbed
a good deal about railroad crossing cases, and .. . your opinion

in the two crossing cases will be very helpful to the DistrictJudges
in the future.' ' 162 William Baker, Judge of the Northern District
of West Virginia, similarly welcomed Parker's ill-fated opinion in
Red Jacket as helping "a great deal to let both mine operators and
labor organizations know their respective rights."' 63
B. Procedure
Improvements in legal procedure quickly claimed Parker's
attention and energies. He favored an approach elevating
substance over form, facts over legal categories. A conviction
that "it is better to analyze the facts of the case, rather than to
indulge in reasoning on legal definitions" received articulation in
a government contract case.'6 4 "Intricate legal arguments have
been advanced with great ingenuity of reasoning and wealth of
'
learning in support of ... conflicting contentions." 165

But,

the freshman jurist argued:
[T]he answer to the questions involved is to be found, not in technical
reasoning from legal definitions applied to the forms in which the parties
have clothed their transactions, but in a careful study of the facts
conducted with a view of ascertaining the real relationship which existed
between the parties and the substance, not the form, of the agreements
into which they entered."b

Concern for facts as distinguished from form resulted in
short shrift accorded legal technicalities. Parker emphatically
favored the "liberal rules of practice"'6 7 which prevailed in
North Carolina, a code-pleading state since Reconstruction. 6 '
The native Tar Heel waxed euphoric in lauding its procedural
rules as an "almost ideal system of jurisprudence-one which is
simple, expeditious and conducive to decisions of questions on
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Parker's treatment of an important issue of procedure raised
in RedJacket reflected his approach. The United Mine Workers
of America ("UMWA") had alleged a misjoinder of parties in the
appeal of a sweeping injunctive decree against the Union's
organizing campaign in southern West Virginia's bituminous
coalfields. 7 ' The UMWA asserted that as each operator sued
"to protect his individual business . . . there is no common right
whose protection is sought by the suits."''
Each must sue
separately. Parker disagreed in an extended analysis. "There is
but one conspiracy and that conspiracy is directed against the
business of complainants as a class, not because of any of the
individual characteristics of the various businesses, but because
they are operating on the nonunion basis within a certain
territory." ' 72 The court's refusal to consolidate the cases "in
order to promote the convenient administration ofjustice" would
not only be unjust but would also impose on the trial court the
loss of "months or years, to the exclusion of other business." '
Justice and efficiency made it, Parker declared and erudite
colleague Rose agreed, 74 "absurd for the courts to require that
there be presented in 316 different cases against the same parties
a question which could be determined in a single case. '
Parker's advocacy of simplified procedure included minimiz' 76
ing the "distinctions between actions at law and equity."'
Application to federal practice of what the North Carolina Law
Review termed a "liberal and progressive tendency"'1 77 manifested itself in Great American Insurance Co. v. Johnson. 78 When
counsel for the insurance company complacently introduced no
testimony and serenely awaited judgment on grounds that the
insured had erroneously sought a remedy at law rather than in
equity, Parker fairly bristled. "Shall we," he asked, "reverse ...
merely because the case was heard on the law side [and] ...
hark back to the outworn technicalities of a day that is
dead?"'79 Nothing required Parker to find prejudicial error
and to order a new trial "where all of the evidence in the lower
court is before us, where it appears that the case was fully
developed, and where the relief obtained at law is exactly what
...
should have been awarded in equity."' 8 ° When the Taft
Court denied certiorari, 8 ' this implicit affirmation of his theory
of procedural law pleased Parker because he regarded Great
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American as marking "a distinctive
step forward in the liberaliza82
tion of federal procedure."'
The same treatment of legal forms surfaced in his consideration of criminal procedure issues. It was enough that criminal
indictments contained sufficient information "to fairly and
reasonably inform the defendants of the character of the offense
charged."8 3 The failure of indictment language "to allege that
the automobile was in fact stolen when it is alleged that the
defendants on receiving it knew it to have been stolen can be
nothing more than a defect of form which could not possibly
tend to their prejudice."'8 4 In the privacy of his memorandum,
however, he exclaimed: "[I]t would be a reproach to the
administration ofjustice to allow defendants to escape conviction
on such a technicality."' 85 Time and again, Parker would cut
through the crust of mossy forms with the sword of "harmless
The rationale for such sword wielding never
error."186
changed. "Courts," he declared in Great American, "exist to do
justice, not to furnish a forum for intellectual skill or prowess,"' 87 and "to leave the parties feeling that justice has been
done."'88
C. Court Management
Even as a freshman judge, Parker involved himself in court
administration. Advocacy of executive-centered government
organization had been a pronounced theme in his 1920 North
Carolina gubernatorial campaign;8 9 as judge, he put theory
into practice. No sooner had he joined the appellate bench than
pleas from thejudge of the Eastern District of North Carolina led
him to hold that court's August term at Wilmington. 9 ' At its
close, the congested trial docket had been cleared. A committee
of the local bar was appointed, Parker informed the resident
judge,
to go over the docket and report to you at the next term as to the state
of a lot of old cases which are pending, with recommendation as to what
disposition should be made of same, and direct that the clerk place these
cases on the calendar for the next term."'

The strategy elated its beneficiary who marveled:
[Y]our order appointing a commission to clean house with respect to the
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docket comes like a straight flush in a weary hand. I never had thought
of that and perhaps never would have thought of it.I shall do the same
thing at Raleigh .. . [where] there is more dead wood in old junk ...

than there was at Wilmington."'

Imperatives of expeditious court administration moved
Parker to seek methods of cutting "down frivolous petitions for
re-hearing."' 93 Such petitions, he complained, "take up considerable time and involve considerable delay in the disposition of
cases."' 194 One method involved eschewing obiter dicta in
judicial opinions. "Suggesting theories upon which it might be
possible to sustain the contentions of plaintiff," he wrote Rose,
who sometimes favored an expansive literary style, only served to
"invite petitions for rehearing and strenuous contention in future
cases."' 95 Thus, the safest course from an administrative perspective, if not from a political perspective as became apparent
in Red Jacket, involved simply announcing "our conclusion on the
facts of this case, without suggesting what we might do if the facts
were not as they are."' 96
Another method for improving case management involved
amending the rules of court to conform with familiar procedure
followed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. That court
utilized a screening system for handling rehearing petitions.
'' However desirable
Parker considered the step "a good one."
any proposed reform in court rules, presiding Judge Waddill
could be expected to object to their adoption on the grounds
that they would complicate the judicial task.' 98 Hurdling that
obstacle might require the intervention of the Chief Justice of
the United States, a strategy Parker contemplated in 1928 when
preparing to attend the annual meeting of the American Law
Institute in Washington.' 99
The circuit court's foremost administrative problem from
1927 to early 1931 related to management of inter-court transfers
of district judges to it, a task statutorily assigned to the court and
construed by Waddill as empowering the Senior Circuit
Judge.0 9 Waddill's periodic disablements, however, caused the
duty to default to Parker, notwithstanding statutory ambiguity
enveloping the subject.
Transfers required assessing the
availability of district judges, scheduling their services on the
appeals court, and seeking Waddill's approval for the assignments, approval which might or might not be forthcoming
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Former Virginia Readjuster and political lawyer Edmund Waddill, Jr. (1855-1931) had
been appointed in 1898 by President William McKinley to the U.S. Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia and in 1921 by President Warren Harding to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. The Senior (presiding) CircuitJudge was in the twilight of a long
and tumultuous career when this portrait was made in the late 1920s. Source: Photo No.
LC-USZ62: 91073, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

depending on the state of the senior judge's mental and physical
health.0 1
In his first years as judge, Parker became de facto court
administrator. It proved a delicate position in light of Waddill's
uncertain health and the statutory silence respecting administrative powers ascribed to a judge who lacked seniority. Especially
was this true when the subject at hand involved inter-court
transfers to the appellate court. The senior judge's hierarchical
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sense of administration impelled him to disfavor gratuitous offers
of such assistance made by trial judges. These offers "should
originate in the upper house," he reportedly told one district
judge. °2
Parker boldly questioned this policy.20 3
He also
differed with Waddill over the presence on the circuit bench of
Eastern Virginia's Groner, a man whom Parker held in high
esteem and devoutly wished promoted to the appellate court
level.20 4 Waddill, however, had refused to invite Groner to
serve on the court-personal animosity apparently precluded an
invitation. 5 When the approach of the 1929 June term in
Asheville brought news of the seniorjudge's indisposition, Parker

mused that
Groner would really be of more help to us than any of the others except
Soper, but I am afraid thatJudge Waddill would feel that we were taking
advantage of his absence to do something that he would not do. On the
other hand, ... Judge Waddill's absence would enable us to bring
2 [Groner] to the Court without causing friction. 1'1

Getting wind of the plan to transfer Groner, Waddill unhelpfully
suggested that "we can get along with any unfinished cases just
as well at the October term."20 7 Parker rejected the backloginducing carry-over plan, and Groner, among four districtjudges,
arrived to expedite judicial business at the court's Asheville
term.

208

Having completed their assignments, travelling judges
routinely submitted expense vouchers. Parker approved them in
Waddill's absence and transmitted them to the Department of
Justice for payment.2 9 No provision in the Judicial Code
specifically sanctioned this or other administrative acts performed
by any judge other than the presiding judge. Parker acknowledged "that the statute does not expressly give me power, "211
but considered himself duty bound "not to let the work of the
21
Circuit suffer by reason of Judge Waddill's illness. '
The young judge reasoned that "Congress must have
intended that in case of serious illness of the Senior Circuit
Judge, resulting in his incapacity, the next Judge in order of
seniority should attend to the work of the Court. ' 212 That
logical thought had apparently never entered the collective mind
of Congress! At most, existing law empowered the judge next in
seniority to preside over the court in the senior circuit judge's
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"absence."2" 3 No mention was made of permanent physical
disablement nor of the manifold administrative functions, other
than that of presiding in open court, which formally and
informally fell to the most senior appellate judge.2 14 Parker
met this statutory lacuna by giving "a liberal interpretation" to
the section which enumerated the powers of the senior circuit
judge.2" 5 Such a construction seemed justifiable because the
words "senior judge" did not refer exclusively to the specific
judge holding that title, but rather constituted a generic term
embracing any judge who de facto performed the requisite duties
of the court's presiding officer.2 16
The issue of the senior judge's disability would come to a
head at the 1931 Judicial Conference of Senior CircuitJudges, 2as
17
the Judicial Conference of the United States was then titled.
By the time the Conference convened that fall, the issue had
been mooted by Waddill's death.2" 8 Forty-five-year-old Parker
succeeded him, formally assuming Senior CircuitJudge status at
whatJudge Soper declared "an absurdly youthful age, in defiance
of all laws of nature."2" 9 At the conference, Parker's pragmatic
construction of the statute astounded ChiefJustice Charles Evans
Hughes, who chaired the assembly of ranking jurists.22 Hughes
lectured Parker on the statute's explicitness and successfully
urged its recasting to specify devolution of circuit administrative
221
power to an appellate judge other than the senior jurist.
Three years later, Congress resolved the Waddill-induced
administrative conundrum by providing that the appellate judges
in order of their commission assume the duties of a disabled
presiding judge.222 Thus, Parker's conception of effective court
management, implemented by him during his initial years on the
bench, became a permanent part of the Judicial Code.
VI. Conclusion
The opening years ofJohnJ. Parker's nearly thirty-three-year
career on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit attest to the leadership opportunities available even to a
"freshman" jurist as well as to the pitfalls associated with it. His
youthful energy, professional expertise, and executive qualities
filled a void created by the physically infirm presiding judge, by
other periodically disabled colleagues, and by the rotation
throughout the appellate court of a platoon of district judges.
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Members of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (Judicial Conference of the United
States) October 1-3, 1930 gathered on the Capitol steps for the first meeting chaired by
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and the first, attended, in the absence of disabled
Senior Circuit Judge Edmund Waddill, Jr., by a dejected Judge John J. Parker (Cir. 4)
following the Senate rejection of his Supreme Court nomination the previous May. Left
to right on the front row: George H. Bingham (Cir. 1), Martin T. Manton (Cir. 2),Joseph
Buffington (Cir. 3), Charles E. Hughes (CJ.U.S.), Arthur C. Denison (Cir. 6), Robert E.
Lewis (Cir. 10), Frank H. Rudkin (Cir. 9, substituting for William B. Gilbert); on the rear
row: Samuel Alschuler (Cir. 7), Kimbrough Stone (Cir. 8), Walter P. Bryan (Cir. 5), John
J. Parker (Cir. 4). Except for the appearance of Curtis D. Wilbur (Cir. 9), the membership
of the 1931 Conference remained unchanged from that of 1930. Source. Photo No. LCUSZ62: 17314, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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To be sure, he deferred to colleague Rose, but that judge's
tutelage faltered within a year and irrevocably terminated within
sixteen months of Parker's appointment. Even before Rose's
untimely death, the freshman had made material and acknowledged contributions to the work of the court. More were to
come, for as an experienced federal appellate judge he would
author opinions in landmark cases of regional and national
importance.2 23
During the 1930s he achieved prominence as an advocate of
national law reform.2 . and of rules of civil procedure developed
and controlled by judges rather than by legislators or lawyers.22 5
Also, after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938,226 he would seek their implementation by federal
judges through his chairmanship of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure2 2 7 as well as their emulation
by the judiciaries of the several states.228 In addition to promoting procedural codification and simplification, Parker became
a national advocate of judge-centered court management. His
early ventures into the administrative realm vastly multiplied after
1931 when he became Senior Circuit Judge,22 9 a permanent
member of the Judicial Conference from 1931 through 1957,230
and Chairman of the American Bar Association's Section of
Judicial Administration in 1937-38."l

In these different capaci-

ties, he helped to forge the Act of August 7, 1939, formally
creating the circuit judicial councils and conferences as well as
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 3 2 and to
develop the minimum standards of judicial administration
encapsulated in Arthur T. Vanderbilt's landmark book by the
same title.2 33
Parker's career as a "freshman" owed much to his own
natural abilities and ambition as well as to anticipatory socialization, including academic and extracurricular achievements as an
undergraduate, courtroom experience, and partisan politics.
Purely fortuitous events opened opportunities for judicial
leadership that otherwise might have remained closed during the
"freshman" years on the intermediate federal appellate court
bench. Yet, those same fortuitous events that thrust him at a
young age into a leadership position on the Fourth Circuit court
also imposed a high cost. His assignment to write the opinion in
Red Jacket derived from his productive capacity and the esteem in
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which he was held by the presiding judge. Blackstonian proclivities combined with a cryptic opinion style would impale him
when his Supreme Court confirmation evoked politically potent
and ultimately fatal opposition."'
From 1930 until his death in 1958,235 Parker could contemplate his freshman years on the court of appeals and the wholly
unanticipated cost they imposed on his ambition for a seat on
the United States Supreme Court. Would greater maturity and
longer experience on the bench have made a difference? Had
not his phraseology in delineating the scope of the injunction
traced that approved by Waddill and Rose in previously decided
post-Hitchman cases arising out of the strife-torn West Virginia
coalfields?236 How, he plaintively wondered in 1930, could his
senior brethren have erred? After all, "they were both veteran
jurists ... with much experience upon the bench, both in the

District and the Circuit Courts." Parker had no such background. Writing in the third person, he lamented that "he was
not only the youngest judge of the three, but was junior in rank,
having been appointed only a little over a year when this case was
decided."23' 7 Upon further reflection and after the elapse of
more than a decade, the opinion's author admitted the political
damage to his Supreme Court quest imposed by the "freshman"
effect. Writing Harvard Law Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. late
in 1941, Parker mused: "Had I been longer upon the bench I
might have attempted some criticism of the Hitchman decision." 38 Hindsight sharpened by the then-recent entombment
of the tattered Hitchman doctrine undoubtedly emboldened
him.239 Rhetorical ventures in opinion writing had been out of
the question for Parker the "freshman" jurist at a moment when
his apparent omnicompetence on the bench deeply impressed
and gratified those who witnessed his performance.
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TABLE A
Caseload of Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals: 1925-1930
Fiscal Year
Case Pending
Cases Docketed
Cases Terminated
Percent caseload
Terminated
Terminated per
Judge
Cases Pending
(for Decision)
(for Argument)

1925*
177
110

1926
196
142

1927
163
108

1928
169
126

1929
173
122

1930
232
162

124

141

120

118

103

145

70.1

71.9

73.6

69.8

59.5

62.5

41.3

47.0

40.0

39.3

34.3

48.3

(30)

(27)

(13)

(26)

(45)

(24)

(28)

(30)

(28)
(23)

(44)

(42)

*-Parker not seated.
Source "Statement of Cases Docketed, Disposed of, and Pending." Exhibit A-1, Circuit
and District Reports File 1925-1930, Records of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Library, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.

TABLE B
Case Filings in Regional Courts of Appeals by Fiscal Year: 1926-1930
1926 (Cir)
47
(2)
48
(8)
49
(9)
50
(6)
51
(5)
52
(7)
53
(1)
54
(3)
55
(4)

1927
413
401
306
291
291
150
144
108
108

(Cir)
(2)
(8)
(9)
(5)
(6)
(3)
(7)
(1)
(4)

1928
405
377
329
251
242
229
126
123
122

(Cir)
(2)
(8)
(9)
(3)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(1)
(7)

1929
451
405
338
274
271
253
150
128
122
109

(Cir) 1930
(2)
463
(8) 318
(9)
314
(6)
307
(3) 263
(5)
233
(7)
201
(10)
187
(4)
162
(1)
101

(Cir)
(2)
(8)
(8)
(9)
(3)
(6)
(7)
(10)
(4)
(1)

Source. U.S. Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States: 1926-1930
(1926-1930).
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TABLE C
Caseflow in Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1925-1930
#
Events Consummated

Days

Min. #

Max. #

Standard

Days

Days

Deviation

Filing of Record to Issuing
of Mandate (n=451)

253.7

37.0

2479.0

142.7

96.2

9.0

558.0

48.7

9.5

1.0

192.0

29.9

199.3

45.0

366.0

97.3

83.9

1.0

396.0

54.7

56.5

1.0

1247.0

72.3

Filing of Record to Filing
of Last Brief (n=50)
Filing of Last Brief to
Duel Argument (n=452)
Oral Argument to
Reargument (n=15)
Argument or Reargument to
Issuing of Opinion (n=488)
Issuing of Opinion to
Issuing of Mandate (n=434)

Source: 6-8 Clerk's Official Term Dockets (Office of the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, Richmond, Va.)

TABLE D
Authorship of Full Court Opinions, 1925-1930

judge
Parker
Rose-Northcott
Waddill
District Judges
TOTAL

No. Opinions
159
128
72
94
453

Source. 8-42 Federal Reporter, Second Series (1925-1930)

Percent of
Total Opinions
35.1
28.3
15.9
20.7
100.0
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TABLE E
Business of the Fourth Circuit Oct. 1925 through April 1930
(n = 604)
Rank
1.
2.

3.

Subject
Contracts
Criminal Law & Proc.
(Crim Law)
(Crim Proc)
Bankruptcy

4.
5.

Admiralty
Taxation

67

Torts
Commercial Law
Property
Corporate Law
Patents
Business Regulation
Other
Unidentified per curiams

45
35
24
18
16
8
32
40

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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